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BANKRUPTCY COURTS AND STARE DECISIS:

THE NEED FOR RESTRUCTURING
Jeffrey J. Brookner*
Under stare decisis,' a cornerstone of the common law,2
courts must strictly follow previous decisions of higher courts
and must give due deference to prior decisions of their own
court.3 In the last decade, several bankruptcy judges have
held-seemingly in contravention of stare decisis-that they
are not strictly bound by domestic4 district court decisions even
though bankruptcy decisions are appealed to the domestic
district court. These decisions are improperly reasoned. Stare
decisis demands that lower Courts owe absolute obedience to
higher courts. Thus, as the system is currently structured,
bankruptcy courts should follow domestic district court precedent.
Requiring bankruptcy courts to obey district court precedent,
however, would be bad policy. Bankruptcy judges are better

*
Executive Editor, University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform, Volume 27,
1994. B.A. 1991, University of Texas; J.D. 1993, University of Michigan Law School.
Associate, Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C.
I would like to thank my Note Editors, Phyllis Hurwitz and Mona Patel, for their
help and patience with this long process. Special thanks also to David Tess and Peter
Hardy for their helpful commentary on late drafts.
1.
Stare decisis is short for stare decisis et non quieta movere ("Let stand what
has been decided and do not disturb what is settled."). 1B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402(1), at 1-4 (2d ed. rev. 1993).
2.
See id. at 1-9; Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of Our Notion of Precedent, in
PRECEDENT IN LAW 9, 9 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (stating that precedent plays
a pivotal role in common law systems). In contrast, civil law jurisdictions apply
jurisprudence constante, under which only a multiplicity of decisions reaching the
same result can establish a binding principle of law. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding stare
decisis foreign to the civil law and instead relying on, though not being bound by, a
number of appellate decisions that reached the same result). See generally Robert L.
Henry, JurisprudenceConstante and Stare Decisis Contrasted, 15 A.B.A. J. 11 (1929)
(contrasting common law's stare decisis and civil law's jurisprudence constante in
which the initial presumption is that precedent is not binding subject to certain
exceptions); Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of JudicialInterpretationin Louisiana,22
LA. L. REV. 727 (1962) (discussing methods by which judges in Louisiana adjudicate
disputes).
3.
See infra Part I for further discussion of the stare decisis rules.
4.
Domestic district courts are those district courts from the same jurisdiction
as the bankruptcy judge. See Carr v. Michigan Real Estate Ins. Trust (In re Michigan
Real Estate Ins. Trust), 87 B.R. 447, 463 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
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equipped to make bankruptcy decisions than district judges.5
Bankruptcy judges' refusal to obey district court precedent,
albeit beyond their authority, ensures that bankruptcy
decisions are made by judges with the greatest expertise in
bankruptcy issues. Requiring bankruptcy judges to follow
district court precedent would elevate form over substance.
By not following domestic district court precedent, bankruptcy judges go beyond valuing substance over form; they
ignore form in pursuit of substance. Disregarding domestic
district court precedent fails to acknowledge that the hierarchy
of the judicial system exists for substantial reasons. This Note
advocates a restructuring of the judicial system to reflect the
policy goals underlying bankruptcy law, rather than continuing
with the current structure, under which bankruptcy judges
pursue their own agendas without regard to their proper role
in the overall judicial scheme.
Part I of this Note provides background by summarizing the
rules of stare decisis. Part II refutes the contention that the
present court structure allows bankruptcy judges not to follow
domestic district court precedent. Part II asserts that, in
pursuit of legitimate ends, bankruptcy judges have employed
illegitimate means. Finally, Part II contends that bankruptcy
judges are better equipped to make bankruptcy decisions than
district judges. Part III concludes that the bankruptcy system
should be restructured to allow bankruptcy judges to make
decisions without being constrained by district court precedent
or appeals. Such reform could achieve the substantive goals
desired by bankruptcy judges without undermining the current
structure of the judicial system.

I. STARE DEcIsIs RULES AND POLICIES

The traditional stare decisis doctrine in American jurisprudence has two principal aspects.6 First is the obedience

5.
See infra Part II.D.
6.
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Colby v. J.C. Penney Co. distinguishes "persuasion" from "authority" and stresses
the importance of this distinction for stare decisis purposes. See Colby v. J.C. Penney
Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1122-24 (7th Cir. 1987); cf 1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1,
1 0.402(1), at 1-22 (stating that the two aspects of stare decisis are "the principle that
a court will consider itself bound by its own prior decisions unless there are convincing
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principle7 : courts are bound to follow strictly the decisions of
a court to which the court owes obedience. 8 Second is the conservatism principle: courts must give some deference to decisions from their own court or a court on their own hierarchical
level .'

A. The Obedience Principle

The first aspect of stare decisis is the obedience principle,
which states that courts must strictly follow previous decisions
of judges to whom they owe obedience.1 ° A court owes
obedience to any other clearly superior court. For example,
district courts are obliged to follow decisions of the court of
appeals from their own circuit, 1 ' and courts of appeals and
district courts must follow previous Supreme Court decisions. 2

reasons for overruling them, and the principle that a decision will be followed by all
courts owing obedience to the court that rendered it'). The concepts of "persuasion'
and "authority" are referred to in this Note by the terms "obedience principle" and
"conservatism principle," respectively. See infra Parts L.A & I.B for a discussion of
each principle in turn.
7.
See id. 1 0.402(1), at 1-10 n.14 (using the language "obedience principle").
8.
1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1,
0.402(1), at 1-10 to -12. Under this scheme,
lower courts are free to distinguish higher court precedent, but are prohibited from
overruling applicable precedents directly. Further, dicta from higher court decisions
are not binding upon lower courts, although such dicta are considered to be highly
persuasive. Id.
0.402(2), at 1-10 to -12. See generally id. 0.402(2), at 1-27 to -43
(stating that binding precedent only derives from matters properly before the court
that have been explicitly heard and decided).
9.
Id. 1 0.402(1), at 1-8 to -10.
10.
Id. 1 0.402(1), at 1-4.
11.
See, e.g., In re Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 794 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that a district court must follow court of appeals precedents "no matter how
misguided the judges may think them'); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930,933
(9th Cir. 1981) (stating that district courts must follow court of appeals precedent "no
matter how egregiously in error they may feel their own circuit to be'), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 828 (1982); Distribuidora Dimsa v. Linea Aerea del Cobre, 768 F. Supp. 74,
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "[a] district court has no authority to reject a
doctrine developed by a higher court unless subsequent events make it 'almost
certain that the higher court would repudiate the doctrine if given a chance to do so''
(quoting Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir.
1986))); Shelton v. Hawaii Carpenters' Pension, Health & Welfare Apprenticeship,
Vacation & Holiday and Annuity Trust Funds, 691 F. Supp. 251, 255 (D. Haw. 1988);
Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 144 B.R. 105, 108 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); see also
1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, 1 0.402(1), at 1-10 to -12 (describing the hierarchical
order to which the obedience principal applies).
12.
Hutto v. Davis, 454 US. 370, 375 (1982) (stating that lower federal courts
must follow Supreme Court decisions "no matter how misguided" those decisions are);
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Difficulty arises when the obedience relationship between two
courts is not so obvious, such as the relationship between
bankruptcy judges and domestic district courts.
The obedience principle serves many purposes. First, the
obedience principle prevents judicial anarchy. The federal
judiciary resembles a pyramid; higher authority courts have
fewer judges than do lower authority courts. 3 In the United
States, there are ninety-four federal judicial districts.14
Decisions of these courts are appealed to the thirteen courts
of appeals. 5 Court of appeals decisions are appealable to the
Supreme Court. 6 Without an obedience principle, each of
these 108 courts would be free to reach its own preferred
result. Judges at all levels would seek to impose their own
senses of justice on the judicial system, and chaos would
result. 17 The obedience principle precludes such independence,
thereby unifying the court system.
By controlling chaos, the obedience principle permits litigants to predict the outcome of a case more accurately." Both
litigants and persons wishing to avoid litigation need to be
able to rely upon precedent in order to know what their legal
rights and duties are.'" When the obedience principle is applied strictly, a litigant can be certain that the lower courts
will follow the precedents set by courts of higher authority.
Thus, individuals can make decisions without having to speculate at the possible legal consequences of their actions.

In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); Taffi, 144 B.R.
at 108 (stating that "circuit courts of appeal, district courts and bankruptcy courts,
are absolutely bound by decisions of the [Supreme] Court on issues of law"); see also
1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, 0.402(1), at 1-10 & n.14 (stating that without the
obedience principle, our court system would be mired in endless appeals).
13.
First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor (In re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 241 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1991).
14.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
15.
See id. §§ 41, 1291.
16.
See id. § 1254.
17.
Muskin Inc. v. Industrial Steel Co., Inc. (In re Muskin), 151 B.R. 252, 254
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that "every judge's ego must be tempered with the
knowledge that he or she was not appointed to impress his or her own ideas of what
is right on the world, but rather to make the legal system work efficiently and
justly"); cf Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1980) (stating that "the
trial judge ... is not, despite his best intentions, a law unto himself").
18.
See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); Muskin,
151 B.R. at 255.
19.
P.J. Downey, Certainty and Stare Decisis, 1986 N.Z. L.J. 137, 139 (quoting
Howley v. Lawrence Publishing Co., Ltd., No. 77/84 (C.A. May 1, 1986)); see also
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403; cf 1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, 0.402(3.-1), at 1-46
to -47 (noting that "courts must give appropriate consideration to the justifiable
reliance on precedent").
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Another advantage of the obedience principle is that it
reduces the volume of appeals to higher courts. 20 Economic
necessity assures that most parties appeal adverse decisions
only when there is a significant probability of success on
appeal. If a lower court decides an issue in accord with a
higher court precedent, the litigants are less likely to appeal
the decision because they know that the higher court is predisposed towards the lower court's position, making reversal
unlikely.2 1 If the lower court ignores the higher court ruling,
however, the losing litigant has an incentive to appeal because
the higher court has shown a predisposition against the lower
court result, making reversal likely. 22 Thus, in order to
prevent an unnecessary and costly appeal, the lower court
should, according to the principle, follow the higher court
precedent.2 3
A final policy justification for the obedience principle is that
it provides equal treatment for parties in factually similar
circumstances. 24 American jurisprudence is founded upon the
concept of "equal justice under the law." 25 To the extent that
rules bind more courts, more courts will enter consistent
judgments. Thus, more litigants will be treated equally. By
binding all the courts in a geographic region to the decisions
of the highest court of that region, the obedience principle
increases the equality of the treatment litigants receive from
courts.
B. The Conservatism Principle
The second facet of the stare decisis doctrine is the conservatism principle, which states that courts must strive to

See Moragne, 398 US. at 403-04; In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557,
20.
0.402(1), at 1-10 n.14.
565 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1992); 1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1,
21.
See Downey, supra note 19, at 139 (recognizing that the volume of appeals
will increase when a court frequently reviews its earlier decisions).
22. Id.
23.
See Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1980) (stating that the
trial court's refusal to follow a higher court precedent cost the "litigants and the
judicial system considerable time and money which should not have been expended").
24.
See Flowers v. United States, 764 F.2d 759, 761 (11th Cir. 1985); see also 1B
0.402(3.-l), at 1-44 (stating that "society has a strong
MOORE ET AL., supra note 1,
interest in stability, predictability, and equal treatment").
25.
This phrase appears across the top of the United States Supreme Court
building.
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follow decisions that the court itself rendered in the past.2 6 For
example, the United States Supreme Court makes a strong
attempt to follow its past decisions, although it remains free
to reconsider them under extreme circumstances.2 7 Similarly,
even though district courts are not bound strictly by domestic
district court precedent,2 8 district judges show great deference
to previous opinions of other judges within their district.2 9
Perplexingly, courts of appeals apply the obedience principle,
not the conservatism principle, within a circuit. A decision by
a three-judge panel of a court of appeals is binding law for
future panels of the same circuit; to reverse a previous panel's
decision, the court of appeals must sit en banc.3 ° Presumably,
a court of appeals sitting en banc is free to review previous en
banc decisions but would be conservative in doing so.
The conservatism principle serves the same purposes served
by the obedience principle, but with less certainty. The
hesitancy to abandon precedent furthers the purposes of the
obedience principle to the extent that it encourages uniformity

26.
1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, 1 0.402(1), at 1-8 to -10.
27.
See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 564 (1991)
(stating that the Supreme Court "will not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis
without some compelling justification"); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (stating that the Supreme Court does "not lightly overrule
recent precedent"); see also 1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, 1 0.402(1), at 1-8 (stating
that the Supreme Court retains the ability "to change its mind").
28.
See, e.g., Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 n.7
(3d Cir. 1991) (citing numerous authorities for the proposition that there is no such
thing as the law of the district); In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 566 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1992); see also 1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, 1 0.402(1), at 1-20 (asserting
that "one [district] judge may not feel bound by [the decisions of] another judge
sitting in the same district"). But see Hutchinson v. Cox, 784 F. Supp. 1339, 1342
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (stating that domestic district court precedent is binding, but then
suggesting in the alternative that, even if the precedent was not binding, it was
correct).
29.
FDIC v. Cherry, BeKaert & Holland, 129 F.R.D. 188, 193 n.5 (M.D. Fla.
1989); see also Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating that a court should give "considerable weight" to its own previous decisions,
although not specifically referring to district courts).
30.
See Nichols v. McCormick, 929 F.2d 507, 510 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991) In Nichols,
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which he was
convicted. A previous panel had ruled the statute to be constitutional as applied to
a defendant in substantially the same factual situation. The panel dismissed the
complaint because the court had no power to review the previous panel's decision. Id.
For further articulation of this rule, see United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418 (8th Cir.
1991); United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1991); Flowers v. United
States, 764 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985); Placid Oil Co. v. F.E.R.C., 666 F.2d 976 (5th
Cir. 1982). But cf North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 552 F.2d 1036, 1044 &
n.8, 1045 (4th Cir. 1977) (declining to follow an appellate decision which had not been
reviewed en banc because all but one judge from that decision had recused).

FALL 1993]

Bankruptcy Courts and Stare Decisis

319

of result.3 1 Whenever a court decides to abandon a prior
precedent, however, the purposes of the obedience principle
are undercut-the litigants' predictive powers are reduced and
the current litigants receive treatment different from that
received by the prior litigants.

II.

THE CURRENT DISTRICT COURT-BANKRUPTCY
COURT RELATIONSHIP

Under the Bankruptcy Code of 197832 (the Code) as amended,3 3
most decision-making authority rests in the bankruptcy court.3 4
Appeals from bankruptcy courts go first to the domestic district
court,35 or to a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP),3 s then to the
court of appeals, 37 then to the Supreme Court. 3' Bankruptcy
31.
See supra Part I.A.
32.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp.
1992)).
33.
The Code is amended often. Significant relevant changes to the Code were
made by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
34.
Under the 1984 amendments to the Code, original jurisdiction over bankruptcy
matters rests in the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991). The district
court then has the power to refer cases to the bankruptcy court, 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)
(1988), which they usually do. Cf. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 3.01(2)(a) (Lawrence
P. King et al., eds., 15th ed. 1979 & Supp. Nov. 1992) [hereinafter COLLIER] (stating
that all district courts have a rule which automatically, though revocably, refers
bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts). After referral, the bankruptcy judge
has decision-making authority only for the actual bankruptcy case and for "core"
proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988). Most proceedings relevant to the bankruptcy
case are "core." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES 358 (1990) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]
(stating that more than 95% of matters before bankruptcy courts are core) reprinted
in 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORTS (1990); see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1988) (defining which proceedings are
core); COLLIER, supra, I 3.01(2)(b)(iii), at 3-49 (discussing in detail which types of
proceedings are core). It has been argued that there are only two types of non-core
proceedings: suits by debtors which arose prepetition and suits between third parties.
Id. Thus, bankruptcy courts exercise power over almost all bankruptcy matters.
35.
28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988).
36.
The judicial council of a circuit may vote to establish a BAP for their circuit,
and, if they do so, district judges may refer appellate cases to the BAP. Id. § 158(b)(1)
& (3) (1988). The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit which has a BAP presently. 1
COLLIER, supra note 34,
3.03(1)(c)(ii), at 3-169.
37.
Both district court and BAP decisions are appealed to the circuit court. See
28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
38.
Id. § 1254.
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courts decided early cases on the unchallenged assumption
that domestic district court decisions bound bankruptcy
courts.3 9 In the mid-1980s, however, bankruptcy courts began
to assert their independence from district courts. For example,
a bankruptcy judge in 1986 asserted, albeit correctly, that he
was not bound by dicta from domestic district court decisions,
especially when other decisions within the district were contrary.4" The last case on record to assert explicitly that
domestic district court decisions bind bankruptcy courts was
announced in 1988; again, the binding nature of precedent was
assumed, not argued.4 Subsequent cases have argued in detail
that bankruptcy courts are not bound by domestic district
court decisions.42 No published opinion has advocated in detail
the application of stare decisis rules to the bankruptcy courtdistrict court context.
The bankruptcy judges' argument, translated into the terms
used by this Note, is that bankruptcy judges should treat
domestic district court precedent under the conservative

39.
See, e.g., In re Moisson, 51 B.R. 227, 229 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (stating
that domestic district court precedent binds the bankruptcy court and therefore
imposes an equitable lien in order to validate a reassignment of a liquor license
without a financing statement filing); Joanis v. Wayzata Bank & Trust Co. (In re Inv.
Sales Diversified, Inc.), 49 B.R. 837, 846 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (stating that the best
rule would be to allow avoidance of a creditor's prior vendor's interests in a contract
for deed with a strong-arm clause, but holding otherwise as required by domestic
district court precedent); Eaton Land & Cattle Co. II v. Rocky Mountain Inv., 28 B.R.
890, 892 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (stating that domestic district court precedent compelled a holding that an automatic stay tolls the redemption period of a Colorado
statute despite the existence of contrary, and more recent, domestic bankruptcy court
precedent); In re V-M Corp., 23 B.R. 952, 954-55 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982) (stating
that the bankruptcy court is bound by the decision of the relevant district court to
disallow an omitted claim as long as the creditor had actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceedings); WGR Assoc. v. Heritage Bank, N.A. (In re Bill Ridgway,
Inc.), 4 B.R. 351, 353 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (stating that even unpublished domestic
district court decisions are binding; Fessenden Hall, Inc. v. Mission Marine Assoc.,
Inc. (In re Mission Marine Assoc., Inc.), 3 B.R. 548, 550 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (stating
that the bankruptcy court must follow domestic district court precedent that U.C.C.
§ 2-702 reclamation rights do not constitute a valid statutory lien under the since
repealed version of 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A)); cf York v. Shepherd (In re Shepherd),
56 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985) (stating that domestic district court
decisions are binding, especially if they are cited with approval throughout the
country).
40.
In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 67 B.R. 692,698-99 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1986).
41.
See Carr v. Michigan Real Estate Ins. Trust (In re Michigan Real Estate Ins.
Trust), 87 B.R. 477, 463 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
42.
See, e.g., In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 566-67 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992); First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor (In re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 241-43 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1991).
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principle, not under the obedience principle. Bankruptcy
judges use two main arguments to support their proposition
that domestic district court decisions do not bind bankruptcy
courts. First, because bankruptcy courts are a "unit of the
district court"4 3 under the Code, bankruptcy judges claim that
they are not subject to the obedience principle, which applies
only to inferior courts." Second, bankruptcy judges argue that
application of the obedience principle to the conflict between
bankruptcy courts and district courts would not further the
policies behind the principle.4 5 This Part attacks both of these
contentions and asserts that the present bankruptcy court
structure dictates that district court precedent strictly binds
all bankruptcy courts within the district. This part then
concludes, however, by arguing that forcing district judges to
follow domestic district court precedent is illogical because
bankruptcy judges make better bankruptcy decisions.

A. Bankruptcy Courts Are Structurally Inferior Courts

Bankruptcy judges' first argument in support of their freedom not to follow domestic district court precedent is that the
bankruptcy courts are units of the district court and thus are
not inferior to district courts.4 6 In 1984, Congress established
47
each bankruptcy court as a "unit of the district court."
Bankruptcy judges argue that bankruptcy courts therefore are
not inferior courts, but rather are part of the same court.48

43.
The phrase "unit of the district court" was first used in the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333,
336 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
44.
This argument relies upon a misunderstanding of stare decisis. See, e.g.,
Shattuc, 138 B.R. at 565 (erroneously citing 1B MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, for the
proposition that the obedience principle applies only to inferior courts). Actually, the
obedience principle applies not to inferior courts per se but to any court which owes
.obedience" to another court, a purely conclusory standard. See infra Part II.A and
note 51 and accompanying text.
45.
See Gaylor, 123 B.R. at 241-43.
46.
See Shattuc, 138 B.R. at 566.
47.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333, 336 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
48.
E.g., Shattuc, 138 B.R. at 566; In re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551,555 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1991). Bankruptcy judges concede that their courts are inferior to courts of
appeals, and thus that they are bound to follow appellate court precedent from within
their own circuit. See Shattuc, 138 B.R. at 565; see also Taras v. Commonwealth
Mortgage Corp. (In re Taras), 136 B.R. 941, 948 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (stating that
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Thus, district court decisions emanate from the same court,
not from a higher court. Because district court decisions do not
bind judges of the district court,4 9 and because bankruptcy
judges are judges of the district court, district court decisions
do not bind bankruptcy judges either.5"
This argument is not compelling. The Code admittedly
establishes each bankruptcy court as "a unit of' the district
court. A unit of a larger whole, however, can owe obedience to
the larger whole. 5 ' The sales department of General Motors is

bankruptcy courts must follow the law of the circuit "to the extent that it is not
plainly inconsistent" with Supreme Court precedent); In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 498
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (holding that the bankruptcy court is bound by its circuit
court precedent); Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 103 B.R. 660, 668
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that the applicable circuit court's precedent is
binding despite another court of appeals' conflicting decision on a similar issue). But
see In re Thompson, 59 B.R. 690, 694-95 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986) (refusing to apply
domestic circuit court precedent because the precedent was clearly erroneous, because
other courts of appeals had reached a contrary result, and because the statute had
been amended).
49.
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
50.
Shattuc, 138 B.R. at 565-66; In re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551, 554-55 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1991); see also Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Corp.), 149 B.R. 614, 619 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that the court was
following domestic district court precedent because it was correct, not because it was
binding, but holding that bankruptcy courts are bound by BAP decisions). Bankruptcy
judges concede that they owe deference to district court decisions (i.e. that they
should apply the conservatism principle to domestic district court precedent). See
Shattuc, 138 B.R. at 567 (stating that bankruptcy courts should "give deference to
and seek to follow" domestic district court decisions); In re Davis, 134 B.R. 34, 37 n.6
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991) (noting that domestic district court decisions, while not
binding, deserve deference); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. (In
re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 115 B.R. 1011, 1015 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (implying
that bankruptcy courts should yield to domestic district court precedent even where
a court of appeals decision from another circuit is contrary); Rude v. Whitehorn (In
re Whitehorn), 99 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (stating that "generally
bankruptcy judges should follow the decisions of their district courts"). This deference
is no greater, however, than that owed to domestic bankruptcy court precedent. See
In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc., 67 B.R. 692, 698-99 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1986) (following a decision of a fellow bankruptcy judge despite the existence of
contrary domestic district court precedent, which admittedly was owed some
deference); cf Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 130 B.R. 170, 176
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1991) (stating that a bankruptcy judge should follow precedents of
another bankruptcy judge within the district "unless a compelling reason or public
policy consideration demands").
51.
Furthermore, it begs the question to suggest that a court does not owe
obedience to another merely because it is not structurally inferior. Moore states that
a court must follow a precedent of a court to which it owes obedience. 1B MOORE ET
0.402(1), at 1-4 (commenting that "a decision on an issue of law
AL., supra note 1,
...is binding... on such other courts as owe obedience to its decisions"). It skirts
the issue altogether to state that bankruptcy courts owe no obedience because they
are not inferior courts; the "unit of" analysis leaves us to determine whether courts
can owe deference to another court even if they are not structurally inferior. The
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"a unit of" the corporation, 2 but the sales manager still owes
obedience to the board of directors. It is at least conceivable
that bankruptcy courts owe obedience to district court precedent.5 3 Whether bankruptcy courts in fact do owe such
obedience depends on whether such obedience would further
the policies underlying stare decisis.
B. The Policy Bases of Stare Decisis
Bankruptcy judges' second argument in support of their
freedom not to follow domestic district court precedent is that
the policies underlying the obedience principle are inapplicable
to the bankruptcy court context. Bankruptcy judges therefore
claim that they should be obliged to apply only the conservatism principle.5 4 This argument fails because the policy
bases of stare decisis do apply to the bankruptcy context,
albeit less so than in other contexts.
First, bankruptcy judges argue that the application of the
obedience principle to the bankruptcy court context does not
increase predictability. Because there are roughly two district
judges for every bankruptcy judge,55 a bankruptcy judge or
litigant has to research more reports, not fewer, to find controlling precedent at the district level. "The goal of predictability is not well-served when one lower court judge must
look to the decisions of... as many as twenty different higher
courts."5 6

answer to that question in New York is yes. The intermediate appellate courts in
New York are not separate courts but "appellate division[s]" of the trial courts. See
N.Y. JUD.LAW § 71 (McKinney 1983). Nonetheless, appellate division precedent binds
state trial courts. See, e.g., Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 539 N.Y.S.2d 906,
907 (App. Div. 1989); Messina v. County of Nassau, 557 N.Y.S.2d 837, 841 (Sup. Ct.
1990). Just as New York trial courts owe obedience to the Appellate Division,
bankruptcy judges can owe deference to federal district courts.
52.
One could argue that a corporation's sales department is indistinguishable
from the corporation as a whole. Likewise, Judge Arthur J. Spector has claimed that
"the bankruptcy courts are. . . indistinguishable from the district courts." See First
of Am. Bank v. Gaylor (In re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 243 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991).
Bankruptcy courts, however, are indeed distinguishable from district courts. See infra
Part II.B.
53.
At least one commentator has concluded that bankruptcy courts are structurally inferior to district courts. See Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in
the Supreme Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 477, 494 (1988) (stating that bankruptcy
courts are "clearly subordinate to and supervised by" the district courts).
54.
Gaylor, 123 B.R. at 241-43.
55.
See id. at 242.
56.
Id.
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This argument fails because it addresses the number of
judges potentially hearing bankruptcy matters, not the number of actual cases. There cannot be more bankruptcy cases
decided in district courts than in bankruptcy courts and
district courts combined. Accordingly, a rule making district
court decisions binding, as opposed to making both district
court and bankruptcy court decisions important but not compelling, would reduce the amount of precedent that a litigant
would have to consult in deciding how to address an issue."
Declaring district court precedent binding upon bankruptcy
courts in fact would narrow the number of cases to which a
litigant must resort.
Furthermore, predictability always will increase where some
binding precedent exists, even if that precedent is harder to
locate. A litigant aware of a domestic district court precedent
would know that all bankruptcy courts were bound to follow
it, and thus the litigant could rely on that precedent. Once a
district court addressed an issue of bankruptcy law, therefore,
the law of the district would become more predictable.58

57. An unscientific sampling of cases conducted by the author confirms that this
approach would cut the amount of applicable precedent roughly in half. Using
WESTLAW, the author searched the bankruptcy database for all cases in the
bankruptcy courts (FBKR-BC) and district courts (FBKR-DC), isolating cases from
certain judicial districts during the first quarter of 1993.
TABLE 1

Bankruptcy Court

Jurisdiction

District Court Cases

Cases

S.D.N.Y
E.D.N.Y
W.D.N.Y.
N.D.N.Y.
D. Colo.
N.D. Ga.
M.D. Ga.
S.D. Ga.
D. Me.
W.D. Wis.
E.D. Wis.

TOTAL

J

25
10
6
3
9
5
3
0
6
1
0

32
7
4
3
10
2
1
1
4
1
3

68

68

58. Of course, the law of the district would not become settled. Making district
court precedent binding upon bankruptcy courts would not bind the district court to
affirm the ruling on appeal. Any inconsistency of precedent, however, would arise
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Prohibiting bankruptcy judges from ignoring domestic district
court precedent would further the predictability goal of the
obedience principle.
Second, bankruptcy judges argue that the application of the
obedience principle to the bankruptcy court context would not
reduce the volume of appeals.5 9 The obedience principle usually reduces the volume of appeals because the failure of a
lower court judge to follow a higher court's decisions will, or
at least should, result in automatic reversal.6 ° A rule forcing
the lower court to follow the higher court precedent renders
the perfunctory appeal unnecessary. In contrast, bankruptcy
judges argue, a bankruptcy court's departure from domestic
district court precedent will not necessarily be reversed,
because a decision of a domestic district court is not settled, as
it does not bind other district judges. 6
Even when a domestic district court precedent requires a
certain result in the bankruptcy court, the decision of the
bankruptcy court may be reversed on appeal; a bankruptcy
case could be appealed to a district judge who disagrees with,
and who will choose to depart from, the precedent set by the
author of the domestic district precedent.6 2 Though a strictly
applied stare decisis doctrine would increase the predictability
of the bankruptcy court result, the continued possibility of
reversal on appeal would give the litigants some incentive, to
appeal more often. 3 Bankruptcy judges argue, therefore, that
the obedience principle does not work to reduce the volume of
appeals in the bankruptcy context.
The argument that the obedience principle would not reduce
appeals in the bankruptcy context, however, is overstated.
Though the litigant knows that the district judge to whom the
case is appealed has the power to reconsider the previous
district judge's opinion, the litigant also knows that that judge
only at the district court level. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928
F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991).
59. See In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 566 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992);
Gaylor, 123 B.R. at 241-42.
60. See supra note 22.
61. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, for
62.
example, cases are randomly assigned by the computer. Telephone interview with
Joan Davenport, Clerk of Courts, Bankruptcy Appeal Clerk, United States District
Court, Southern District of Texas (Mar. 15, 1994). Subsequent cases involving the
same debtor are sent to the judge who heard the first matter involving that debtor.
Id.
63. See Shattuc, 138 B.R. at 566; Gaylor, 123 B.R. at 242.
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will employ a conservative outlook in reviewing his sister
judge's decision. 64 Because reversal is unlikely, the incentive
to appeal still is somewhat lower than it would be if the
obedience principle was not applied. Thus, binding bankruptcy
courts to follow district court precedent would reduce the
volume of appeals.

C. JudicialPower Should Rest in Article III Courts

A further reason to apply the obedience principle to the
district court-bankruptcy court relationship is that district
courts, but not bankruptcy courts, are established by Congress
under Article III of the United States Constitution. 65 Although
the Constitution, as currently interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, probably does not mandate that bankruptcy
courts owe obedience to district court precedent, the principles
underlying Article III provide sufficient justification to force
bankruptcy judges to follow domestic district court precedent.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to require only
that "the essential attributes of the judicial power" remain
vested in Article III courts.66 The exact scope of this mystical
"judicial [plower" is unclear. 67 There appears to be no case law
supporting the argument that the Constitution requires that
domestic district court precedent binds bankruptcy courts. This
Note, therefore, does not pursue that argument.
Rather, this Note argues that the policies underlying Article
III justify a rule that bankruptcy courts should consider
themselves to be bound by district court precedent. The
protections afforded to Article III judges make them better
qualified to make important, complex, and controversial
decisions. Because honoring these policies protects the rights

64.
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
65.
U.S. CONST. art. III. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 132-135 (1988) (giving Article III
protections to district judges) with id. §§ 152-153 (establishing bankruptcy courts
without Article III protections).
66.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
77 n.29 (1982) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
67.
See, e.g., J. Anthony Downs, Note, The Boundaries of Article III: Delegation
of FinalDecisionmakingAuthority to Magistrates,52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1032, 1035 (1985);
Note, Federal Magistratesand the Principles of Article III, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1947
(1984).
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of individual litigants 8 and the very structure of the judicial
system, 69 bankruptcy judges should defer to district court
precedent even though the Supreme Court does not consider
the Constitution to dictate that result.
Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in
judges who (1) are appointed by the President upon the advice
and consent of the Senate,7" (2) are given life tenure during
good behavior, 7 and (3) are guaranteed not to receive cuts in
pay.7 2 These protections are designed to guarantee that the
judiciary is not dependent upon the politically-ruled branches
of government, the legislative or executive branches, and is free
to reach correct results even when they are politically unpopular.7 3 When a bankruptcy judge refuses to follow a district
court precedent, there is the ever-present threat that this
departure is the product of influence from outside pressures
upon the bankruptcy judge, who may be seeking to protect his
future in the judiciary.7 4 The district court precedent should
prevail because that decision was made under the protections
of Article III. Bankruptcy courts therefore should be considered
lower courts as compared to district courts under the current
structure, and domestic district court precedent should bind
bankruptcy courts.

D. Bankruptcy Judges Are Superior Decision Makers on
Bankruptcy Law Issues

As the above discussion asserts, the current bankruptcy court
structure dictates that bankruptcy judges should follow
domestic district court precedent. Nonetheless, bankruptcy

68.
Downs, supra note 67, at 1036.
69.
Id. at 1036-37.
70.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
71.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
72.
Id.
73.
See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 59 & n. 10 (1982); Anne G. Maseth, Jurisdiction:A New System for the Bankruptcy
Courts, 2 BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 4 (1985). The protections were implemented in response
to a major complaint of the American colonists against British rule-that the colonial
judges were dependent upon the will of the King of Great Britain. FederalMagistrates
and the Principles of Article III, supra note 67, at 1949.
74.
Unlike Article III judges, bankruptcy judges do not have life tenure. Instead,
bankruptcy judges serve 14-year terms after appointment by the judges of the circuit
court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
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judges are better equipped to decide bankruptcy matters than
are district judges. Bankruptcy law is highly specialized and
intricate. 7 Most district court judges are relatively unfamiliar
with bankruptcy law 76 and have no time to learn it. v7 It is
counterproductive, therefore, to vest bankruptcy decisionmaking power in the district court. Thus, this note advocates
the removal of the district courts from the bankruptcy system,
leaving the complexities of bankruptcy cases to the decisionmaking power of specialist bankruptcy judges.
Opponents of specialized bankruptcy courts argue that it is
best to leave bankruptcy policy to "generalist judges who are
not insulated from the rest of the law."78 This concern is
addressed by leaving the court of appeals, or at least the
Supreme Court, in the appellate structure, v9 which this Note
recommends.

III. ALTERNATIVES FOR A NEW STRUCTURE

Much academic attention has been focused in the last two
decades on restructuring the bankruptcy court system.8 °
Proposals have included giving Article III status to bankruptcy

75.
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 34, at 361 (stating that the
Bankruptcy Code rivals the Internal Revenue Code in complexity); Thomas E. Carlson,
The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 559, 565 (noting
the highly complex nature of bankruptcy issues).
76.
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 34, at 362 (recognizing that
"even the most diligent district court judges cannot acquire the same expertise in
bankruptcy matters" as BAP judges).
77.
Id.; Carlson, supra note 74, at 559; Conrad K. Cyr, Structuring a New
Bankruptcy Court: A ComparativeAnalysis, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 157 (1978).
78.
BANKRUPTCY REFORM CIRCA 1993: A PRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S BANKRUPTCY CODE REVIEW PROJECT 55 (1993) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY REFORM CIRCA 1993]; Simon H. Rifkind, Bankruptcy CodeSpecialized Court Opposed, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 187, 187-88 (1978). But see Carlson,
supra note 74, at 564-65 (supporting the creation of a separate Article III bankruptcy
court as necessary to provide the high level of competence essential to an adjudication
of complex bankruptcy issues); Lawrence P. King, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized Court
Supported, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 193, 194 (1978) (stating that bankruptcy judges'
expertise is not limited to bankruptcy issues).
Carlson, supra note 75, at 565; see also BANKRUPTCY REFORM CIRCA 1993,
79.
supra note 78, at 55 (stating that a specialized appellate tribunal would achieve
greater uniformity in decisions and increase the efficiency of the appellate process).
For a discussion of different possible structures, see Cyr, supra note 77, at
80.
146-56. For a proposal that BAP's be established in each circuit, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 34; Carlson, supra note 75, at 558-67.
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judges or to BAP judges, establishing BAP's in all thirteen
circuits, eliminating district courts from the bankruptcy court
system altogether, getting rid of bankruptcy specialists altogether, or a combination of some of the above proposals.
This Note proposes that, whether or not in conjunction with
another reform, the district courts should be removed from the
bankruptcy court structure. Removing district court judges
from the bankruptcy structure would cure the illogic of the
current system. Non-Article III bankruptcy judges no longer
would be forced to struggle to circumvent the precedents
established by Article III district judges who are not bankruptcy experts.
A variety of altered structures would remedy the problem
discussed in this Note. For example, the district courts simply
could be removed from the appeals process, with appeals from
the bankruptcy court going directly to the courts of appeals, or
to a BAP for the circuit. BAP and court of appeals precedent
would be fully binding on bankruptcy courts. If a BAP is used,
appeal from the BAP could go to the court of appeals, or
directly to the Supreme Court. Alternatively, all bankruptcy
appeals could be heard before a national bankruptcy appellate
court, much like the Federal Circuit currently hears intellectual property appeals. Or perhaps all bankruptcy matters
could be consolidated before a single bankruptcy trial court,
similar to the United States Tax Court.
The number of satisfactory bankruptcy systems is limited
only by the imagination of the legislators revising the system.
What is important is that the structure of the bankruptcy
courts should facilitate the rendering of sound bankruptcy
decisions. If specialists are to decide bankruptcy issues, then
the hierarchy should enable them to do so without ignoring
their proper role. In other words, bankruptcy judges should not
be bound to follow district court precedent. Within these
constraints, the decision on exactly how to structure the system
should hinge upon considerations beyond the scope of this
Note, such as expense and effectiveness.
The fact that resolution of bankruptcy matters ultimately
will be settled by a nonspecialist court is not problematic.
Although the Supreme Court, and the courts of appeals, if they
remain in the chain of appeal, are not bankruptcy specialists,
they differ from the district courts. Appellate courts have time
to delve into complex issues in more depth, and they have the
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mechanisms to make this possible."s Further, the judges on
courts of appeals typically are more highly qualified, often
having served for many years as district judges or having
otherwise distinguished themselves before ascending to the
appellate level. Lastly, decisions at the appellate level are
made by more than one judge, increasing the amount of
thought that goes into an issue and decreasing the likelihood
that a major facet of the problem is overlooked or
misunderstood.

CONCLUSION

The present bankruptcy court structure is inconsistent with
its intended function. The experts, the bankruptcy judges, are
at the bottom of the decision-making hierarchy subject to
review by the district courts. Recognizing that they are more
knowledgeable on bankruptcy issues, bankruptcy judges
disregard domestic district court precedent that they disagree
with and reach the result that they favor in order to increase
the quality of decision making.
At best, the current structure is awkward and illogical; at
worst it is a dangerous violation of jurisprudential and Constitutional rules. It is senseless to place the best decision
makers at the bottom of the decision-making hierarchy. Even
worse, doing so leads such decision makers to ignore the
system in order to reach functional results. If bankruptcy
judges are to make bankruptcy law, then we should establish
a system that allows bankruptcy judges to do so effectively
within the confines of the Constitution and the common law.

For example, appellate courts regularly call upon outside experts to submit
81.
amicus briefs to help them resolve a matter correctly. See American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists Pa. Section v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 646-47 (3d
Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Also, appellate litigants have more time to
focus on an issue, brief their arguments in detail, and present oral arguments. This
depth of analysis typically is more difficult in the heat of a trial court proceeding.

